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THE ABIDING INFLUENCE OF THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX
GEORGE L. PRIEST'
It is an honor to be invited to write about Judge Robert H.
Bork's contributions to antitrust law. It is also a pleasure to join
in paying tribute to Judge Bork's work. When I joined the fac-
ulty at Yale, Judge Bork was a colleague, though I did not get
to know him then. But when Judge Bork left Yale, I inherited
his antitrust course. At Yale Law School at least (and only so
far as the classroom), I am Judge Bork's successor.
Despite all of the horrible things that Judge Bork continues to
say about the Yale Law School (he has recently added the Yale
Club to the list), he remains an important and dominant pres-
ence there today. Intellectually, I would like to think that my
antitrust class closely resembles the course that he taught or
would be teaching if he had stayed. But Judge Bork has a con-
tinuing presence in a different sense. Antitrust remains a popu-
lar course, drawing 60 to 80 students per year, which is a very
large class by Yale Law School standards. Indeed, the Law
School possesses only two or three classrooms that can accom-
modate that number. In the room in which I typically teach the
class, on the back wall directly facing the instructor, and look-
ing over the shoulders of every student, is a large portrait of
Judge Bork. It is an excellent portrait, though perhaps empha-
sizing Judge Bork's sternness and seriousness more than his
wonderful sense of humor. The presence of the portrait, how-
ever, has two effects on the class. First, it keeps the instructor
on track. If I were even to entertain the suggestion that some-
thing in an antitrust opinion, say, of Justice William O. Doug-
las, made any sense, a quick glance at the portrait would
immediately disabuse me of the thought. The second effect is
• John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Yale Law School. I am grateful
to the Program for Studies in Capitalism at Yale Law School for support. These
remarks were presented at the Federalist Society's Conference on the Contribu-
tions of Judge Robert H. Bork on June 26,2007.
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on the students. Many students, at least at the beginning of the
course, will present arguments based on concepts of the exis-
tence of barriers to entry, of the ability of a firm with market
power to leverage that power from one market to another, or of
harms related to foreclosure. To deal with arguments of this
nature, all the instructor needs to do is to ask students making
such contentions to look over their shoulders at Judge Bork's
portrait. What, in any other light, is a serious portrait becomes
a scowling portrait, and has a wonderful effect on performance
and understanding in the class. Judge Bork's influence on the
understanding of antitrust law will be sustained at Yale Law
School for many generations into the future.
This brief Essay seeks to place Judge Bork's important book,
The Antitrust Paradox,l into the context of the Chicago School's
contribution to the modem direction of antitrust law. Virtually
all would agree that the Supreme Court, in its change of direc-
tion of antitrust law beginning in the late 1970s, drew princi-
pally from Judge Bork's book both for guidance and support of
its new consumer welfare basis for antitrust doctrine.2 Many
outside the Chicago School, however, and some within, have
regarded Judge Bork's contribution in the book as chiefly de-
rivative of ideas of Aaron Director that had been developed by
Director's students and research associates, such as Lester Tel-
ser, John McGee, Judge Bork, and others.3 Judge Bark has not
dissented from the point: in The Antitrust Paradox, he generously
attributes his learning from Director and from the associates that
Director brought to Chicago.4 But Judge Bork's contribution to
the success of the Chicago approach should not be understated.
To view Judge Bork's work as derivative seriously underval-
ues his contribution to the development of modem antitrust
1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978).
2. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct, 31
HARV. J.L. & PuB POL'y 439 (2008); Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of Antitrust
Policy: Where it has Been, Where it is Now, Where it Will be in its Third Century, 9
CORNELL}.L. & PuB. POL'Y 239, 248 (1999).
3. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1997); Spencer W. Waller, Antitrust: New Economy, New
Regime: Second Annual Symposium of the American Antitrust Institute: The Language of
Law and the Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283,300--01 (2001).
4. BORK, supra note 1, at ix-xi.
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law. To be sure, Aaron Director had many important and semi-
nal ideas, in particular with respect to the economic effects of
vertical practices.5 Without question, The Antitrust Paradox builds
on those ideas. As I shall explain, however, the book extends far
beyond those basic ideas by translating them persuasively for
members of a Court neither trained in nor sympathetic to eco-
nomic analysis and, furthermore, by convincing the Court that
consumer welfare is the only coherent standard on which to
base modern antitrust law.6
That portion of Chicago School thought that addresses in-
dustrial organization derives from a single basic principle:
Markets in the real world are generally highly competitive,
constrained only by real costs of operation. It follows from this
proposition that markets operate at a position very near to that
which might be called "efficient" -efficient given the costs that
firms must face. It further follows from the proposition, again
given the presumption of general competitiveness, that actions
taken in the market by a single firm generally represent a
means for advancing the interests of the firm by providing
value to consumers. Put conversely, if a firm's practices did not
provide value to consumers, the firm would fail in the competi-
tive battle. Thus, there is a presumption in Chicago School
analysis that individual firm practices generally benefit compe-
tition and consumers, rather than the reverse. This is the basis
that led the Chicago School to be critical of, if not scathing to-
ward, the expansion of antitrust law condemning industrial
practices from the earliest years-such as Standard OW-and
most especially in the years following the second New Deal.s
The basic assumption of high levels of competition, and of
the necessity of a single firm to provide value to consumers in
all of its practices, formed the foundation of the many seminal
ideas concerning vertical practices that are associated with the
work of Aaron Director and his associates, including Judge
5. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Aaron Director's Influence on Antitrust Policy, 48 J. LAW
& ECON. 313 (2005).
6. See BORK, supra note 1, at 81-89.
7. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.s. 1 (1911).
8. The Chicago School approach to these issues is discussed in George L. Priest,
The rise of law and economics: a memoir of the early years, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 350 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K.
Rowley eds., 2005).
HeinOnline -- 31 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 458 2008
458 Harvard Journal ofLaw & Public Policy [Vol. 31
Bork. Thus, Director intuited that a firm can only exploit mar-
ket power to the extent of that power, and can only gain a sin-
gle monopoly profit. Similarly, a firm generally will be unable
to leverage market power possessed in one market into another
competitive market. Further, foreclosure of competition in a
market represents market success, not anticompetitive victory.
These ideas are the foundation of Director's work.9 These ideas
are also a foundation of The Antitrust Paradox, but the book ex-
tends the analysis of antitrust law substantially beyond ideas
relating to vertical practices.
The Antitrust Paradox changed the direction of antitrust law
by systematically applying economic analysis to the legal is-
sues that face courts in antitrust litigation. Although the book
analyzes economics issues, it is at heart-and this accounts for
its success in the courts - a legal book. Its brilliance comes from
its translation of counterintuitive economic analysis into legal
analysis persuasive to the courts.
First, the book made economic analysis-difficult even for
many economists to understand-intelligible and persuasive to
judges possessing no economic background. The repeated cita-
tions to the book by the diverse Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court in the many post-GTE Sylvania10 cases are illustrative.ll
Second, the book expanded Chicago School economic analy-
sis to horizontal practices. Aaron Director had little to say
about horizontal practices. Judge Bork's antitrust work, as ex-
emplified in The Antitrust Paradox, builds on the centrality of
the prohibition of horizontal restraints-cartel agreements-to
the understanding of appropriate antitrust prohibitions. Judge
Bork's seminal emphasis on the significance of Addyston Pipe12
as a formulative antitrust decision is an exampleP It was Judge
Bork, not Director or any other Director associate, who focused
on the centrality of Addyston Pipe, a case involving the horizon-
tal allocation of markets among competitors.
9. See, e.g., Peltzman, supra note 5.
10. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589
(1986); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602--05,
608--09 (1985); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
12. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
13. See BORK, supra note I, at 26-30.
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Third, both in the Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act14 and in The Antitrust Paradox, Judge Bork distilled
the economic learning of the Chicago School into a single,
workable standard for antitrust analysis: the consumer welfare
standard.1s Neither Director nor his associates discussed "con-
sumer welfare" as a standard. The maximization of consumer
welfare, of course, is implicit in their work. Judge Bork made
the standard explicit and, as I shall explain below, convincing
to the courts.
Fourth, The Antitrust Paradox successfully attacked those as-
pects of the antitrust canon that were inconsistent with the con-
sumer welfare standard and with Chicago School analysis.
Thus, The Antitrust Paradox
(1) exposed the lack of content of the concept of preventing
competitive harms "in their incipiency," which had been an
important, but standardless, Clayton Act proposition;16
(2) criticized virtually the entirety of FTC antitrust jurispru-
dence developed during the 1950s and 1960s based upon an
asserted populist approach to antitrust law;17
(3) criticized and deflated the value of protecting small busi-
ness against large business-a principal hallmark of Su-
preme Court antitrust jurisprudence during the 1960s and
1970s (and championed by Justice Douglas)-on the
grounds that the policy harmed consumers at large;18
(4) exposed the fallacy of antitrust policy based on concerns
about so-called "barriers to entry";19
(5) criticized the Court's approach to merger analysis, in par-
ticular, in the now notorious, though then mainstream,
Brown Shoe20 and Von's Grocery21 decisions;22 and
14. Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EeON.
7 (1966).
15. See BORK, supra note 1, at 81--89.
16. Id. at 303.
17. Id. at 198-216.
18. Id. at 205, 256-57.
19. Id. at 310-29.
20. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
21. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
22. BORK, supra note 1, at 198-218.
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(6) demonstrated the general irrelevance of the Robinson-
Patman Act23 amendments in attempting to control retail
distribution practices.24
These are tremendous accomplishments for a single book,
and, indeed, for a career of antitrust scholarship. At the time
this Essay was first drafted, there was one area of antitrust law
in which Judge Bork's contributions had been only partially
successful: resale price maintenance. The Antitrust Paradox
demonstrated, following Director, Telser, and others, that re-
sale price maintenance was most likely to benefit consumers,
not to harm them.25 Although the Supreme Court had moved
largely in the direction suggested by the book-in Monsanto v.
Spray-Rite26 and State Oil v. Khan,27 for example-to dismantle
the widespread prohibitions of resale price maintenance, a sin-
gle precedent survived: Dr. Miles.28 Judge Bork had criticized
Dr. Miles extensively29 but, at the time this Essay was presented
to the Federalist Society/s Conference,3D it remained the single
outstanding anti-Chicago School precedent surviving into the
twenty-first century, something of the order of the baseball ex-
emption,31 which neither Judge Bork nor the Chicago School
has ever bothered to criticize on grounds of relevance. Roughly
one week after the conference, however, the Supreme Court
reversed Dr. Miles, making the Bork revolution of antitrust law
complete.32
There is a further and important feature of The Antitrust
Paradox that has been neglected-especially among economic
23. Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592/ 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
24. BORK, supra note 1/ at 382-94. Following The Antitrust Paradox, the Robinson-
Patman Act has shriveled as law. See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts & L. Lynn Judd, Slot-
ting in the Retail Grocery Business: Does it Violate the Public Policy Goal of Protecting
Businesses Against Price Discrimination?, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 397, 414-15 (1991);
Harry BalIan, Note, The Courts' Assault on the Robinson-Patman Act, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 634 (1992).
25. See, e.g., BORK, supra note I, at 280--98.
26. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
27. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
28. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.s. 373 (1911).
29. See BORK, supra note I, at 32-33, 298.
30. See supra note *.
31. See Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat'l League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 259 U.s.
200 (1922).
32. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
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types like me-but needs to be emphasized. Because the book
contained and distilled so many new and interesting economic
ideas, many readers focused on the economic analysis of indus-
trial practices, a consistent subject of the book.
But the book goes further. It discusses the institutional com-
petence-and limitations-of courts in the context of antitrust
litigation.33 It also examines the virtue of law as law versus law
as political decision making by judges.34 Most importantly, the
book explains why the consumer welfare standard for antitrust
law provides a consistent, normatively defensible, and politi-
cally removed standard for decision by courts.35 In this light,
Judge Bork's contributions in The Antitrust Paradox are related to
his work in The Tempting ofAmerica36 and his other constitutional
writingS.37 In addition to the book's economic analysis, its insti-
tutional analysis of the competence of courts substantially ad-
vanced its success and its persuasiveness with the courts. In the
revolution of antitrust law associated with the Chicago School,
I know of no references by the Supreme Court to Aaron Direc-
tor, Lester Telser, or John McGee, all friends that Judge Bark
acknowledges. The Supreme Court references Judge Bork.38
Finally, although somewhat less directly related to The Anti-
trust Paradox, I wish to discuss Judge Bork's unsuccessful nomi-
nation to the Supreme Court. Here, I gained an honor denied to
my distinguished classmates on this panel, who both were sit-
ting judges at the time. I was not a sitting judge, and thus had
the opportunity to testify in favor of Judge Bork's confirmation
to the Supreme Court.39 In the twenty years since those hear-
ings, the controversy remains. It is important to address this
historical episode, because many readers were not even born at
33. BORK, supra note 1, at 82-83, 86--89.
34. See id. at 419-20.
35. Id. at 405.
36. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990).
37. See, e.g., Robert H. Bark, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 21 (1985).
38. See supra note 11.
39. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Congo 2411-90
(testimony of witness panel 12, including testimony of the Author).
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the time; those in primary or later schools may have incomplete
recollections.
I had expected to testify about the importance of The Anti-
trust Paradox. By the time of my appearance, the principal focus
of the hearings was not Judge Bork's twenty-year contribution
to antitrust law, but a talk that Judge Bork had given at the
University of Indiana Law School that was later published in
the Indiana Law Journal.40
The focus on the Indiana Law Journal piece, however, was a
pretext for a political undercutting of Judge Bark's nomination.
The Senate Judiciary Committee asked me not a single question
with respect to The Antitrust Paradox. Though I have not exam-
ined the entire record for this purpose, I am quite certain that
the Committee devoted little time to Judge Bork's most impor-
tant scholarly contribution. Why? Because it was untouchable,
surely by the members of the Judiciary Committee and their
staffs. By 1987, the time of the hearings on Judge Bork's con-
firmation, the Supreme Court was on the verge of changing its
approach to antitrust law in the direction recommended by
Judge Bark. There was no gain to the Committee from an em-
phasis on the person whose ideas would prove seminal and
would dominate Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence into
the future.
The Committee's focus on the Indiana Law Journal piece, in
contrast, was pretextual. Judge Bork's nomination to the Court
foundered not because of Judge Bork, but because of the Presi-
dent. Judge Bork's nomination to the Court followed very
shortly after the revelation of President Reagan's involvement
in the Iran-Contra affair.41 The Senate could not effectively re-
duce the power of the Commander in Chief with respect to
dealings with Iran or with Nicaragua (the leftist government of
which was opposed by the Contras). Instead, the opposition to
the President's foreign policy concentrated on presidential ap-
pointments: in this instance, on Judge Bork's appointment to
the Supreme Court. President Reagan, not Judge Bork, lost
Judge Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court.
40. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J.1 (1971).
41. The Iran-Contra affair first became known to the public in November and
December of 1986. Judge Bork was nominated in 1987.
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I stated at the time and I still believe that the failure of Judge
Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court was a loss for the
country. Putting aside other areas of law, it was not a terrible
loss in terms of antitrust law. The Supreme Court has contin-
ued in its antitrust jurisprudence to follow the direction of The
Antitrust Paradox. It has sometimes misinterpreted Judge Bork's
direction.42 And there are many cases that might have been de-
cided more coherently if Judge Bork had authored the opin-
ions. But the great and sustained influence of The Antitrust
Paradox cannot be denied, and its originality within the Chi-
cago School tradition remains preeminent.
42. See George L. Priest & Jonathan Lewinsohn, Aspen Skiing: Product Differentia-
tion and Thwarting Free Riding as Monopolization, in ANTITRUST STORIES 229 (Elea-
nor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).
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JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY AND ORIGINALISM
The Tempting ofAmerica: The Political
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